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Abstract
In this article, the epistemic-entrenchment and partial-meet characterizations of
Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision, known as axiom (P), are provided.
In short, axiom (P) states that, if a belief set K can be divided into two disjoint compart-
ments, and the new information ϕ relates only to the first compartment, then the revision
of K by ϕ should not affect the second compartment. Accordingly, we identify the subclass
of epistemic-entrenchment and that of selection-function preorders, inducing AGM revision
functions that satisfy axiom (P). Hence, together with the faithful-preorders characteriza-
tion of (P) that has already been provided, Parikh’s axiom is fully characterized in terms of
all popular constructive models of Belief Revision. Since the notions of relevance and local
change are inherent in almost all intellectual activity, the completion of the constructive
view of (P) has a significant impact on many theoretical, as well as applied, domains of
Artificial Intelligence.
1. Introduction
Belief Revision is the study of knowledge dynamics. The article that is widely considered
to have marked the birth of the field is the seminal work of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and
Makinson (1985). From this work arose a formal framework, now known as the AGM
paradigm, which is to date the dominant framework for the study of belief revision. Within
this framework, the beliefs of an agent are modelled as a logical theory K, also called a
belief set, epistemic input is represented as a logical sentence ϕ, and the revision of K by
ϕ, denoted K ∗ ϕ, is modelled as a function ∗ mapping theories and sentences to theories.
Revision functions are constrained by eight postulates, the AGM postulates for revision,
introduced to capture the notion of rationality in the context of belief change. The functions
that satisfy these postulates are known as the AGM revision functions.1
Parikh (1999) pointed out that the AGM postulates for revision are too liberal in their
treatment of the notion of relevance. According to Parikh, a rational agent does not change
her entire belief corpus during belief revision, but only the part of it that is relevant to
1. To distinguish the research area from the process, we shall use the capitalized term “Belief Revision” for
the former, and the same term in lower-case letters (i.e., “belief revision”) for the latter.
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the new information. To fully capture this intuition of local change, Parikh proposed an
additional axiom, named (P), based on a syntax-splitting approach.
It is worth pausing at this point and noting that the problem of relevance is a crucial
topic in many areas of Artificial Intelligence, and, as a consequence, has received consider-
able attention (Subramanian, Greiner, & Judea Pearl, 1997). Confined to relevance-sensitive
belief change, reference is indicatively made to the work of Gärdenfors (1990), Nebel (1999),
Chopra and Parikh (2000), Chopra, Georgatos, and Parikh (2001), Kourousias and Makin-
son (2007), Makinson (2009), Wu and Zhang (2008), Perrussel, Marchi, and Zhang (2010),
Parikh (2011), Delgrande and Peppas (2018). An interesting application of local change for
diagnosis (i.e., the process of finding the faulty compartment of a malfunctioning system)
has been proposed by Wassermann (2001a), while Hansson and Wassermann (2002) used
local change for handling local inconsistencies that actual agents in the real world hold.
Lastly, Riana and Wassermann (2004) conducted an empirical study using relevance to cut
the search space for a problem solution.
Continuing, axiom (P) was further analysed by Peppas, Williams, Chopra, and Foo
(2015), where it was shown that it is open to two different interpretations; i.e., the weak
(condition (P1)) and the strong (conditions (P1) and (P2)) version of axiom (P).2 In the
same work, both versions were characterized in terms of faithful preorders (a special kind
of preorders over possible worlds).
In this article, we introduce such a characterization in the realm of the epistemic-
entrenchment and partial-meet models. In particular, we formulate new constraints on
preorders over sentences of the underlying language, as well as on preorders over maximal
subsets of a theory not implying the new information (remainders), that characterize pre-
cisely the class of epistemic-entrenchment and that of selection-function preorders, respec-
tively, corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying axiom (P). With these results,
Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom is fully characterized in terms of all popular constructive
models of Belief Revision; thus, the constructive view of axiom (P) is completed.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: The next section introduces notation and
terminology. Then, the necessary background on the AGM paradigm and the notion of rele-
vance in Belief Revision are given. Subsequently, and to make the article self-contained, the
faithful-preorders characterization of axiom (P) is presented, as introduced by Peppas et al.
(2015), and, following that, the epistemic-entrenchment and partial-meet characterizations
of (P) are provided. The last section is devoted to some concluding remarks.
2. Formal Preliminaries
Throughout this article, we work with a finite, non-empty set of propositional variables
P. We define L to be the propositional language generated from P, using the standard
Boolean connectives ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → (implication), ↔ (equivalence),
¬ (negation), the special symbol ⊥ (arbitrary contradiction), and governed by classical
propositional logic. In particular, the logic is identified by its consequence operation Cn.
The operation Cn, which is a function mapping sets of sentences to sets of sentences, is
assumed to satisfy the following properties, for all sets of sentences Γ, Γ′, and all sentences
ϕ, ψ of L:
2. Axiom (P), as well as conditions (P1) and (P2), will be discussed in Section 4.
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Inclusion: Γ ⊆ Cn(Γ).





Monotonicity: If Γ ⊆ Γ′, then Cn(Γ) ⊆ Cn(Γ′).
Supra-classicality: ϕ ∈ Cn(Γ), if Γ classically implies ϕ.




iff (ϕ→ ψ) ∈ Cn(Γ).
Compactness: If ϕ ∈ Cn(Γ), then ϕ ∈ Cn(Γ′) for some finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
Intuitively speaking, Cn(Γ) is the set of all logical consequences of Γ. The inference
relation |= is used in the following sense:
Γ |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Cn(Γ).
In a similar vein, we also sometimes write Γ |= Γ′ as Γ′ ⊆ Cn(Γ), ψ |= ϕ as ϕ ∈ Cn(ψ),
and |= ϕ as an alternative notation for ϕ ∈ Cn(∅).
A sentence ϕ of L is contingent iff 2 ϕ and 2 ¬ϕ. For a set of sentences (or literals) Γ of
L, we denote by Γ the set of negated elements of Γ; i.e., Γ = {¬ϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ}. We shall write
Cn(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) for sentences ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, as an abbreviation of Cn
(
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}
)
. For any
two sentences ϕ,ψ of L, we shall write ϕ ≡ ψ iff Cn(ϕ) = Cn(ψ).
An agent’s set of beliefs will be modelled by a theory, also referred to as a belief set. A
theory K of L is any set of sentences of L closed under Cn; in symbols, K = Cn(K). We
denote the set of all consistent theories of L by K. For a theory K and a set of sentences Γ
of L, we denote by K + Γ the closure under Cn of K ∪Γ; in symbols, K + Γ = Cn(K ∪Γ).
For a sentence ϕ of L, we shall write K + ϕ as an abbreviation of K + {ϕ}.
A literal is a propositional variable p ∈ P or its negation. For a set of literals Q, by
∨
Q
we denote the disjunction of the literals in Q. We will, sometimes, represent the negation
of a propositional variable p as p, for the sake of readability.
We define a possible world (or simply a world) r to be a consistent set of literals, such
that for any propositional variable p ∈ P, either p ∈ r or ¬p ∈ r. The set of all possible
worlds is denoted by M. For a set of sentences Γ of L, [Γ] denotes the set of all possible
worlds that satisfy Γ; i.e., [Γ] = {r ∈ M : r |= Γ}. We use the notation [ϕ], for a sentence




. For a set of worlds V ⊆M, we denote by th(V ) the set
of sentences of L satisfied by all worlds in V ; i.e., th(V ) =
{
ϕ ∈ L : r |= ϕ, for all r ∈ V
}
.
If V is empty, then we define th(V ) = L. Obviously, the set th(V ) is always a theory of
L. We will, often, identify a possible world with the sequence (rather than set) of literals it
satisfies.
Furthermore, some definitions on preorders. A preorder over a set V is any reflexive,
transitive binary relation in V . The preorder  is total iff, for all r, r′ ∈ V , r  r′ or r′  r.
In addition, for any X ⊆ V , min(X,) denotes the set of minimal elements in X, with
respect to ; i.e., min(X,) =
{
r ∈ X : for all r′ ∈ X, if r′  r, then r  r′
}
.
We often consider sublanguages of L. Let Q be a (strict) subset of the set of propositional
variables P. We denote by LQ the sublanguage of L defined over Q. In the limiting
case where Q is empty, we take LQ to be the language generated by ⊥, and the Boolean
connectives. For a sentence x of L, we denote by Lx the minimal language of L, within
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which x can be expressed.3 If x is inconsistent or a tautology, we take Lx to be L∅.4
Moreover, by Px we denote the propositional variables in the minimal language of x, and
by Lx the language LP−Px . Lastly, for a non-empty set of sentences Γ of L, LΓ denotes the
minimal language of L within which all the sentences of Γ can be expressed.
Finally, we shall sometimes project operations defined above for the entire language L,
to one of its sublanguages L′. When this is the case, all notation will be subscripted by the
sublanguage L′. For instance, CnL′(Γ) denotes the logical closure of a set of sentences Γ in
L′, i.e., CnL′(Γ) = Cn(Γ)∩L′, and VL′ denotes the restriction of a set V of possible worlds
to L′, i.e., VL′ =
{
r ∩ L′ : for all r ∈ V
}
. It is clear that the operation is relative to the
original language L when no subscript is present.
3. The AGM Paradigm
In this section, the axiomatic approach of the AGM paradigm is briefly discussed, along
with three well-known explicit constructions for the process of belief revision. The first
construction is based on preorders over possible worlds (faithful-preorders model), the second
on preorders over sentences (epistemic-entrenchment model), and the third on preorders over
sets of sentences/remainders (partial-meet model).
3.1 The AGM Postulates for Revision
In the AGM paradigm, belief revision is modelled as a (binary) function ∗, mapping a theory
K and a sentence ϕ to the theory K ∗ ϕ, representing the result of revising K by ϕ; i.e.,
∗ : K × L 7→ K. The AGM postulates for revision (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8), listed below, appear to
capture much of what characterizes rational belief revision.5
(K ∗ 1) K ∗ ϕ is a theory of L.
(K ∗ 2) ϕ ∈ K ∗ ϕ.
(K ∗ 3) K ∗ ϕ ⊆ K + ϕ.
(K ∗ 4) If ¬ϕ /∈ K, then K + ϕ ⊆ K ∗ ϕ.
(K ∗ 5) K ∗ ϕ |= ⊥ iff |= ¬ϕ.
(K ∗ 6) If ϕ ≡ ψ, then K ∗ ϕ = K ∗ ψ.
(K ∗ 7) K ∗ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ (K ∗ ϕ) + ψ.
(K ∗ 8) If ¬ψ /∈ K ∗ ϕ, then (K ∗ ϕ) + ψ ⊆ K ∗ (ϕ ∧ ψ).
The functions satisfying the above postulates are known as AGM revision functions (or,
simply, revision functions). A guiding intuition in formulating (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8) has been
3. That is to say, Lx contains a sentence that is logically equivalent to x, and, moreover, no proper sublan-
guage of Lx contains such a sentence.
4. For every sentence x of L, Lx is unique (Parikh, 1999).
5. Gärdenfors (1988) and Peppas (2008) present an extended discussion on the postulates.
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the principle of minimal change, according to which a rational agent ought to change her
beliefs as little as possible, in order to (consistently) accommodate the new information.
The AGM postulates for revision do not suffice to uniquely determine the belief set K ∗ϕ
resulting from revising K by ϕ, given K and ϕ alone; they simply intend to circumscribe the
territory of all different rational ways of revising belief sets. What is necessary apart from
the above axiomatic approach, are constructive models for the process of belief revision. In
the rest of this section, the most well-known models shall be discussed.
Note that, for ease of presentation, in what follows, we shall consider only consistent
belief sets, and contingent epistemic input.
3.2 Faithful-Preorders Model
One popular construction, introduced by Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991), is based on total
preorders over possible worlds, called faithful preorders.6
Definition 1 (Faithful Preorder, Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991). For a theory K of L, a
preorder over possible worlds K is said to be faithful to K iff it is total, and such that the
minimal worlds (with respect to K) are those satisfying K; i.e., min(M,K) = [K].7
Given a faithful preorder K for every theory K ∈ K, one can construct a revision
function ∗, by means of the following condition (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991):







Intuitively, K represents a plausibility ranking over possible worlds; the more plausible
a world r is, the lower it appears in the ranking. Hence, (F∗) essentially defines K ∗ ϕ as
the theory corresponding to the most plausible worlds, satisfying the new information ϕ;
i.e., the K-minimal ϕ-worlds.
Katsuno and Mendelzon have shown that the functions induced from faithful preorders
via (F∗) are precisely those satisfying the AGM postulates for revision.
3.3 Epistemic-Entrenchment Model
The second constructive model that is discussed herein has been proposed by Gärdenfors and
Makinson (1988), and it is based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment. An epistemic
entrenchment assigns an epistemic value to the agent’s individual beliefs, which in turn
determines their fate during revision.
Definition 2 (Epistemic-Entrenchment Ordering, Gärdenfors & Makinson, 1988). An or-
dering ≤K of epistemic entrenchment, related to a theory K of L, is a binary relation in L
satisfying the following postulates:8
6. The constructive model of Katsuno and Mendelzon is, essentially, a subsequent reformulation of system
of spheres, introduced by Grove (1988).
7. To be precise, Katsuno and Mendelzon associate faithful preorders with sentences, rather than belief
sets. However, the two approaches are equivalent, given that we are working with a finitary propositional
language.
8. Gärdenfors (1988) and Peppas (2008) present an extended discussion on the postulates.
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(EE1) For all ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ L, if ϕ ≤K ψ and ψ ≤K χ, then ϕ ≤K χ.
(EE2) For all ϕ,ψ ∈ L, if ϕ |= ψ, then ϕ ≤K ψ.
(EE3) For all ϕ,ψ ∈ K, ϕ ≤K ϕ ∧ ψ or ψ ≤K ϕ ∧ ψ.
(EE4) When K 6= L, ϕ /∈ K iff ϕ ≤K ψ, for all ψ ∈ L.
(EE5) If ψ ≤K ϕ for all ψ ∈ L, then |= ϕ.
From the above postulates, it follows that an ordering of epistemic entrenchment is a
total preorder in L.
Intuitively, ≤K represents the relative epistemic loss caused by the removal of a belief
from K; the higher a belief is in the epistemic-entrenchment preorder ≤K , the more is lost
in terms of epistemic value by its removal from K. Consequently, for any two sentences ϕ
and ψ, such that ϕ ≤K ψ, whenever a choice exists between giving up ϕ and giving up ψ,
the former will be surrendered in order to minimize the epistemic loss.
Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) proved that the revision functions induced from
epistemic-entrenchment preorders, by means of (E∗) below, are precisely those satisfying
the AGM postulates for revision (where ≤K is an epistemic-entrenchment preorder related
to every theory K ∈ K):9
(E∗) ψ ∈ K ∗ ϕ iff either ¬ϕ <K ¬ϕ ∨ ψ or |= ¬ϕ.
3.4 Partial-Meet Model
Before presenting the partial-meet model introduced by Alchourrón et al. (1985), some
definitions are in order.
Definition 3 (Remainder Set, Alchourrón et al., 1985). For a theory K of L, and a sentence
ϕ such that ϕ ∈ K, a ϕ-remainder of K is any maximal subset of K that fails to entail ϕ.
Formally, a ϕ-remainder of K is a subset K ′ of K, such that K ′ 2 ϕ, and for any K ′′ ⊆ K,
if K ′ ⊂ K ′′ then K ′′ |= ϕ.
We shall denote the set of all ϕ-remainders of K by K⊥ϕ.
Definition 4 (Selection Function, Alchourrón et al., 1985). For every theory K of L, a
selection function is any function γ that maps a non-empty collection X of subsets of K to
a non-empty subset γ(X) of X; i.e., ∅ 6= γ(X) ⊆ X.
Intuitively, a selection function picks up the epistemically most entrenched ϕ-remainders
of K, for every K ∈ K.
The selection function γ is transitively relational iff it can be produced from a transitive







K ′ ∈ K⊥ϕ : K ′′ 5K K ′ for all K ′′ ∈ K⊥ϕ
}
.
9. To be precise, Gärdenfors and Makinson established a connection between epistemic-entrenchment
preorders and contraction functions, denoted by .−. However, in view of the Levi identity (i.e.,
K ∗ ϕ = (K .− ¬ϕ) + ϕ), the connection with revision functions, mentioned above, follows directly.
Note that condition (E∗) appears in the work of Lindström and Rabinowicz (1991), and Rott (1991a).
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It turns out that the ordering 5K , as defined above, is a total preorder in K⊥ϕ
(Gärdenfors, 1988). In what follows, we shall refer to 5K as selection-function preorder.
The partial-meet model refers to contraction functions .−. However, in view of the Levi
identity, that is, K ∗ ϕ = (K .− ¬ϕ) + ϕ, we get the (partial-meet) revision of K by any
sentence ϕ, by means of the following condition:







When γ is transitively relational, the revision functions induced from (PM∗) satisfy the
AGM postulates for revision.
3.5 Interrelations
Given the connection between faithful preorders and revision functions, which in turn
are connected to epistemic-entrenchment preorders, it should in principle be possible
to establish a direct connection between faithful preorders and epistemic-entrenchment
preorders, for every theory K of L. Indeed, this connection is expressed by the following
condition (Peppas & Williams, 1995):
(EF) For any two contingent sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L, ϕ ≤K ψ iff, for some r ∈ [¬ϕ], r K r′,
for every r′ ∈ [¬ψ].
Theorem 1 follows almost immediately and connects revision functions to epistemic-
entrenchment preorders and faithful preorders.
Theorem 1 (Peppas & Williams, 1995). Let K be a theory of L. Moreover, let ≤K be
an epistemic-entrenchment preorder, and let K be a faithful preorder. Then, ≤K and K
correspond to the same revision function at K, by means of (E∗) and (F∗) respectively, iff
they satisfy condition (EF).
In a similar vein, condition (EP), appearing slightly different in (Rott, 1991b), captures
the relationship between epistemic-entrenchment and selection-function preorders:
(EP) For any two contingent sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L, ϕ ≤K ψ iff, for some ϕ-remainder R
of K, R′ 5K R, for every ψ-remainder R′ of K.
Theorem 2 connects revision functions to epistemic-entrenchment and selection-function
preorders.
Theorem 2 (Rott, 1991b). Let K be a theory of L. Moreover, let ≤K be an epistemic-
entrenchment preorder, and let 5K be a selection-function preorder. Then, ≤K and 5K
correspond to the same revision function at K, by means of (E∗) and (PM∗) respectively,
iff they satisfy condition (EP).
4. Relevance in Belief Revision
When revising a theory K by a sentence ϕ, it seems plausible to assume that only the
beliefs that are relevant to ϕ should be affected, while the rest of the belief corpus should
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remain unchanged. For instance, an agent that is revising her beliefs about the monetary
policy of Greece, is unlikely to revise her beliefs about quantum electrodynamics. This
simple intuition is not fully captured by the AGM paradigm. To see this, the following two
examples should be taken into consideration.
Example 1. Assume that P = {a, b}, and let K be the theory K = Cn(a, b). There exists
an AGM revision function ∗, such that K ∗ (¬a) = Cn(¬a,¬b). That is to say, the revision
of K by ¬a (modulo ∗) results in believing ¬b, even if b is irrelevant to a, with respect to
the belief set K.
Example 2 (Trivial AGM Revision Function, Parikh, 1999). Consider the following revision
policy, encoded by the (trivial) revision function ∗trivial, for any theory K and any sentence
ϕ of L:
K ∗trivial ϕ =

K + ϕ, if ϕ is consistent with K
Cn(ϕ), otherwise
It turns out that ∗trivial satisfies (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8), yet, it is unsatisfactory since, in case
ϕ contradicts K, all beliefs in K that are not logical consequences of ϕ are thrown away.
Accordingly, Parikh (1999) proposed the new axiom (P), presented below, to supple-
ment the AGM postulates for revision. The main intuition that axiom (P) aims to capture
is that, if an agent’s beliefs can be subdivided into disjoint compartments referring to
different subject matters, then, when revising, the agent modifies only the compartment(s)
affected by the new information. Although axiom (P) may not tell the whole story of
relevance-sensitive belief revision (it only deals with a special case), it is surely an intuitive
first step.
(P) If K = Cn(x, y), where x, y are sentences of disjoint sublanguages Lx,Ly, respec-




+ y, where  is a revision operator
of the sublanguage Lx.
Parikh (1999) showed that axiom (P) is consistent with postulates (K∗1)–(K∗6) (known
as the basic AGM postulates for revision). In a further analysis conducted by Peppas et al.
(2015), it was shown that (P) is in fact consistent with the full set of AGM postulates for
revision. In this latter work, two different interpretations of (P) were identified, called the
weak and the strong version of (P), both of which are plausible depending on the context.
According to the first reading, i.e., the weak version of axiom (P), the revision function
 that modifies the relevant part of K — call it the local revision function — may vary from
theory to theory, even when the relevant part Cn(x) stays the same. This means that weak
(P) allows the local revision function to be context-dependent.
For example, consider a revision function ∗ (which defines a revision policy for all theories
of L), and let K = Cn(x, y) and H = Cn(x, z) be two theories of L, such that Lx ∩ Ly =
Lx ∩ Lz = ∅, and y 6≡ z. Consider, now, any sentence ϕ ∈ Lx. The ϕ-relevant part of K
and H is, in both cases, the same; this is not the case for the ϕ-irrelevant part. However,
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Figure 2: The strong version of axiom (P)
weak (P) allows this relevant part to be modified in a different way, for theories K and
H. In other words, while the non-relevant part to ϕ remains unaffected during the (global)
revision by ϕ, its presence can influence the way that the ϕ-relevant part of the theory is
modified (Figure 1).
According to the second reading, i.e., the strong version of axiom (P), the local revision
function  becomes context-independent. In the previous example, the way the ϕ-relevant
part is modified in both K and H is the same (Figure 2).10
To avoid ambiguity between the two versions, Peppas et al. (2015) reformulated ax-
iom (P) in terms of the following two conditions that do not refer to a local revision operator:
(P1) If K = Cn(x, y), Lx ∩ Ly = ∅, and ϕ ∈ Lx, then (K ∗ ϕ) ∩ Lx = K ∩ Lx.





Condition (P1) corresponds to the weak version of axiom (P), and says that, when
revising a theory K by a sentence ϕ, the part of K that is irrelevant to ϕ is not affected
by the revision. To get the strong version of (P), we need to add condition (P2); that is,
strong (P) is equivalent to (P1) and (P2).
Peppas et al. (2015) characterized both versions of axiom (P) in terms of faithful pre-
orders. To make this article self-contained, the aforementioned characterization is presented
in the next two sections.
10. Refer to (Peppas et al., 2015) for a more detailed discussion on this issue.
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5. Faithful-Preorders Characterization of (P1)
In this section, the faithful-preorders characterization of condition (P1) is presented.
5.1 Initial Considerations
First, we introduce some terminology and notation.
Definition 5 (Possible Worlds Difference). The difference between two possible worlds w, r
of M, denoted by Diff (w, r), is the set of propositional variables, over which the two worlds
disagree; i.e., the symmetric difference of w and r. In symbols:
Diff (w, r) =
{




q ∈ P : w |= ¬q and r |= q
}
.
Example 3. Suppose that P = {a, b, c}. Let w, r be the worlds w = {a, b, c} and r =
{¬a, b,¬c}. Then, Diff (w, r) = {a, c}.
Definition 6 (Theory Splitting/Splittable Theory, Parikh, 1999). Let K be a theory of L,
and let Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} be a partition of P; i.e.,
⋃
Q = P, Qi 6= ∅, and Qi∩Qj = ∅, for
all 1 6 i 6= j 6 n. The set Q is a K-splitting iff there exist sentences x1 ∈ LQ1 , . . . , xn ∈
LQn, such that K = Cn(x1, . . . , xn).
Definition 7 (Confined Theory, Parikh, 1999). Let L′ be a sublanguage of L. A theory K
is confined to L′ iff K = Cn(K ∩ L′).
As proved by Parikh (1999), for every theory K of L, there is a unique finest K-splitting,
denoted by F ; i.e., one which refines every other K-splitting.11 That is to say, there is a
unique way to consider theory K as being composed of disjoint (“refined”) compartments,
referring to irrelevant subject matters.
In case a theory K is confined to a sublanguage L′ of L, it also “splits” between L′ and
L′, with the L′ part being trivial. Of course, K knows nothing about L′; i.e., there is no
sentence ξ ∈ L′, such that K |= ξ. Notice, lastly, that, whenever n = 1 in Definition 6, K
is a trivially splittable theory of L.
Example 4. Suppose that P = {a, b, c, d, e, f}, and let K = Cn
(
a → (b ∨ c), d ↔ e
)
.
It is not hard to verify that the finest K-splitting is F =
{





{a, b, c, d, e}, {f}
}
is a K-splitting as well, but not the finest. Observe that theory K
has no information about propositional variable f , since K is confined to the sublanguage
L{a,b,c,d,e}.
Definition 8, below, extends Definition 5, in order to include the difference between a
theory K of L and a possible world r of M.
Definition 8 (Difference Between Theories and Possible Worlds, Peppas et al., 2015). Let
K be a theory of L, and let F = {F1, . . . , Fn} be the finest K-splitting. Moreover, let r be a
possible world of M. The difference between K and r, denoted by Diff (K, r), is the union
of the elements Fi of F , for which there exists a sentence ϕ that can be expressed in the
sublanguage LFi, on that K and r disagree. In symbols:
11. A partition Q′ refines another partition Q iff every element of Q′ is a subset of some element of Q.
Equivalently, a partition Q′ refines another partition Q iff, for every Q′i ∈ Q′, there is Qj ∈ Q, such that
Q′i ⊆ Qj .
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Diff (K, r) =
⋃{
Fi ∈ F : for some ϕ ∈ LFi ,K |= ϕ and r |= ¬ϕ
}
.
Example 5. Let P = {a, b, c, d}, and K = Cn(a ↔ b, c ↔ d). The finest K-splitting is
F =
{
{a, b}, {c, d}
}
. Now, let r be the world r = {¬a, b, c, d}. Then, Diff (K, r) = {a, b},
since K and r disagree on at least one sentence ϕ that can be expressed in L{a,b} (e.g., for
ϕ = a ∨ ¬b, K |= ϕ and r |= ¬ϕ).
Clearly, in the special case of a complete theory K (where there is a world w, such that
[K] = {w}), the extended definition of Diff collapses to the one given for the difference
between two possible worlds.
5.2 Characterization Conditions
Having defined the extended Diff, the appropriate faithful-preorders characterization of (P1)
turns out to be conditions (Q1) and (Q2) (for a theory K of L):12
(Q1) If Diff (K, r) ⊂ Diff (K, r′) and Diff (r, r′) ∩ Diff (K, r) = ∅, then r ≺K r′.
(Q2) If Diff (K, r) = Diff (K, r′) and Diff (r, r′) ∩ Diff (K, r) = ∅, then r ≈K r′.
5.3 Characterization Result
Theorem 3 shows that conditions (Q1)–(Q2) characterize precisely the family of faithful
preorders corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying (P1).
Theorem 3 (Peppas et al., 2015). Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗1)–(K ∗8),
and {K}K∈K a family of faithful preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding to
∗ by means of (F∗). Then, ∗ satisfies (P1) iff {K}K∈K satisfies (Q1)–(Q2).
6. Faithful-Preorders Characterization of (P2)
In this section, the faithful-preorders characterization of condition (P2) is presented.
6.1 Initial Considerations
First, we introduce some more notation. For a contingent sentence x ∈ L and a possible
world r ∈ M, by rx is denoted the restriction of r to the minimal language of x; i.e.,
rx = r ∩ Lx.
Definition 9 (Faithful-Preorder Filtering, Peppas et al., 2015). Let K be a theory of L.
For a faithful preorder K and a contingent sentence x ∈ L, the x-filtering of K , denoted
by xK , is as follows:
r xK r′ iff there is a world w ∈ [rx], such that, for all w′ ∈ [r′x], w K w′.
Intuitively, the x-filtering (of a preorder) can be regarded as a “projection/restriction” of
the initial preorder to the minimal language of x, treating the propositional variables outside
12. ≺K and ≈K denote the strict and symmetric part of K , respectively.
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Px as invisible. Notice, moreover, that xK depends entirely on the minimal language of
x, in the sense that, if x, z are two sentences such that Lx = Lz, then xK = zK , even if
x 6≡ z. Subsequently, a concrete example of x-filtering is presented.
Example 6 (Peppas et al., 2015). Suppose that P = {a, b, c}. Let K be the theory







K abc K abc K
abc
abc
Now, consider the (arbitrary) sentence x = (a∨b∨c)∧(a∨b∨¬c), for which Lx = L{a,b},
since x is logically equivalent to a ∨ b and no sentence with fewer propositional variables is










It is not hard to verify that, for any contingent sentence x ∈ L, if K is a total preorder,
then so is xK . In addition, if Lx = L, then x-filtering has no effect on K ; i.e., xK = K .
6.2 Characterization Condition
Condition (Q3), below, turns out to be the faithful-preorders characterization of (P2) (the
preorders K and Cn(x) are faithful to K and Cn(x), respectively):
(Q3) If K = Cn(x, y) and Lx ∩ Ly = ∅, then xK = xCn(x).
Condition (Q3), essentially, says that, whenever a belief set K can be split into two
disjoint compartments Cn(x) and Cn(y), then the x-filtering of the preorder K , associated
with K, ought to be identical with the x-filtering of the preorder Cn(x), associated with
the first compartment of K. Obviously, (Q3) makes associations between faithful preorders
related to different (overlapping) theories. This is to be expected, since condition (P2)
introduces dependencies between revision policies associated with different theories.
6.3 Characterization Result
Theorem 4 shows that condition (Q3) characterizes precisely the family of faithful preorders
corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying condition (P2).
Theorem 4 (Peppas et al., 2015). Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗1)–(K ∗8),
and {K}K∈K a family of faithful preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding to
∗ by means of (F∗). Then, ∗ satisfies (P2) iff {K}K∈K satisfies (Q3).
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6.4 Combining the Results
Putting together the results of Theorems 3 and 4, we obtain immediately the following
theorem that provides the faithful-preorders characterization of (the strong version of)
Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom.
Theorem 5 (Peppas et al., 2015). Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗1)–(K ∗8),
and {K}K∈K a family of faithful preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding to
∗ by means of (F∗). Then, ∗ satisfies strong (P) iff {K}K∈K satisfies (Q1)–(Q3).
Before closing this section, it is worth noting that Kern-Isberner and Brewka (2017)
generalized the results of Peppas et al. (2015) — and thus of Parikh (1999) — to the
revision of belief states (rather than belief sets).13 Note that a belief state (also referred to
as an epistemic state) is defined as a belief set, coupled with a structure that encodes relative
plausibility (usually, a faithful preorder or a system of spheres). As a consequence, a belief
state is a “richer” model than a belief set. Kern-Isberner and Brewka (2017), also, extended
the approach of Peppas et al. (2015) to ordinal conditional functions (Spohn, 1988).
In the rest of the article, we proceed to our objective, which is to characterize both
conditions (P1) and (P2) in terms of epistemic-entrenchment and partial-meet models.
7. Epistemic-Entrenchment Characterization of (P1)
The epistemic-entrenchment characterization of condition (P1) is introduced in this section.
7.1 Initial Considerations
The necessary terminology and notation are first introduced, taking into account the K-
splitting concept, which is central to Parikh’s notion of relevance.
Definition 10 (Theory Units). Let K be a theory of L, and let F = {F1, . . . , Fn} be the
finest K-splitting. Moreover, let χ1, . . . , χn be sentences of L, such that χ1 ∈ LF1 , . . . , χn ∈
LFn, and K = Cn(χ1, . . . , χn). We shall call sentences χ1, . . . , χn the units of K, and the
set U = {χ1, . . . , χn} the unit set of K.
It can be easily shown that, for every theory K of L, its unit set U is unique (modulo
logical equivalence).
The units of K can be regarded as its “building blocks”, since the conjunction of them
minimally entails K. Moreover, observe that, if LU ⊂ L, then K is confined to the sublan-
guage LU . If LU = L, theory K is not confined to any sublanguage of L.
In the approach of structured belief bases used for local change by Wassermann (2001b),
the unit set U of K would be a belief base which generates K, such that every element
of it (unit) constitutes a different connected subgraph. Note that a belief base is a set of
sentences that is not (except as a limiting case) closed under logical implication, and for all
practical purposes it is in fact finite.
Consider, now, any two contingent sentences ϕ, ψ of L.
13. The extension of relevance-sensitive belief revision to belief states is a necessary prerequisite for covering
iterated revision, as captured by Darwiche and Pearl (1997). This is due to the fact that the revision
functions defined by Darwiche and Pearl (1997) operate on belief states (rather than on belief sets).
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Definition 11 (Support Set). A support set for ϕ in K is a set Γ of units of K that entails
ϕ; i.e., Γ ⊆ U and Γ |= ϕ. A support set for ϕ in K is minimal iff no proper subset of it
entails ϕ. The set of all minimal support sets for ϕ in K is denoted by SS(ϕ).
Intuitively, a minimal support set for ϕ in K is a minimal set of units, that suffices to
“justify” the presence of ϕ in K.
Definition 12 (Cut). A cut for a sentence ϕ in K is a minimal set of units, whose with-
drawal from K will leave ϕ unsupported. Formally, a cut for ϕ in K is a set θ of units of
K, θ ⊆ U , such that U − θ 2 ϕ, and for every proper subset θ′ of θ, U − θ′ |= ϕ.
Clearly, a cut θ for a sentence ϕ in K minimally intersects (“cuts”) every minimal
support set for ϕ in K. Thus, it follows that θ ⊆ L⋃SS(ϕ).
It should be pointed out that minimal support sets and cuts are closely related to the
notions of kernels and incision functions, respectively, of Hansson’s approach to contraction
of belief bases, called kernel contraction (Hansson, 1994) — we shall discuss this relation
later in this article (Subsection 7.4).
Now, we will engage with what we call degree of support of sentences in a theory.
Definition 13 (Degree of Support I). A sentence ψ is better supported than a sentence ϕ
in K, which we denote by ϕCK ψ, iff the following two conditions hold:
(i) For every minimal support set for ϕ in K, there exists a minimal support set for ψ
in K, such that it is a subset of the former; in symbols, ∀ A ∈ SS(ϕ), ∃ B ∈ SS(ψ),
such that B ⊆ A.
(ii) There exists a minimal support set for ψ in K, such that it is disjoint from every
minimal support set for ϕ in K; in symbols, ∃ C ∈ SS(ψ), such that C ∩ A = ∅,
∀ A ∈ SS(ϕ).
From Definition 13, the following lemma is obviously derived.
Lemma 1. For a theory K and any two sentences ϕ, ψ of L, ϕCK ψ iff, for every cut θ′
for ψ in K, there is a cut θ for ϕ in K, such that θ ⊂ θ′.
Proof. Obvious from the definitions of support set (Definition 11), cut (Definition 12), and
Definition 13. 
Intuitively, ψ is better supported than ϕ in K iff, whenever one cuts enough “links” to
“disconnect” ψ from the units of K, regardless of how this is done (there are, in general,
more than one ways), ϕ gets “disconnected” as well.
Definition 14 (Degree of Support II). Sentences ϕ and ψ are equally supported in K, which
we denote by ϕ ∼K ψ, iff ϕ, ψ ∈ K, and, moreover, the set of all minimal support sets for
ϕ in K is equal to the set of all minimal support sets for ψ in K; i.e., SS(ϕ) = SS(ψ).
Analogously, from Definition 14, the following lemma is derived.
Lemma 2. For a theory K and any two sentences ϕ, ψ of L, ϕ ∼K ψ iff ϕ, ψ ∈ K, and,
moreover, the set of all cuts for ϕ in K is equal to the set of all cuts for ψ in K.
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Proof. Obvious from the definitions of support set (Definition 11), cut (Definition 12), and
Definition 14. 
Example 7. Let P = {a, b, c, d, e, f}, and K = Cn(a ↔ b, c ↔ d, e ↔ f). The finest K-
splitting is F =
{
{a, b}, {c, d}, {e, f}
}
, and the unit set of K is U = {a↔ b, c↔ d, e↔ f}.
Let ϕ =
(
(¬a ∨ b) ∧ (¬c ∨ d)
)
∨ e ∨ f , and ψ = a ∨ ¬b ∨ e ∨ ¬f . Clearly, ϕ,ψ ∈ K.
Moreover, SS(ϕ) =
{




{a↔ b}, {e↔ f}
}
. Hence, we derive
that ϕCK ψ.









. Hence, it follows that ϕ ∼K ψ.
The intuitive reading of the above definitions is based on the view that the units of K
are the primary beliefs.
The last definition of this subsection refers to sentences of L, making no reference to a
theory of the language.
Definition 15 (Logical Equivalence Modulo Sublanguages). For a sublanguage L′ of L,
two sentences ϕ, ψ of L are logically equivalent modulo L′, which is denoted by ϕ ≡L′ ψ, iff
[ϕ]L′ = [ψ]L′; namely,
{




r′ ∩ L′ : for all r′ ∈ [ψ]
}
.
From the above definition, the following lemma is easily derived.
Lemma 3. For a sublanguage L′ of L and two sentences ϕ, ψ of L, ϕ ≡L′ ψ iff [¬ϕ]L′ =
[¬ψ]L′.
Proof. Follows directly from Definition 15, and the fact that [ϕ] = M − [¬ϕ] and [ψ] =
M− [¬ψ]. 
Definition 15 implies that, whenever L′ = L, it holds that ϕ ≡L′ ψ iff ϕ ≡ ψ. In
what follows, the sublanguage L′ in Definition 15 will be the sublanguage LΓ of some set
of sentences Γ of L.14 When this is the case, we shall use ϕ ≡Γ ψ, instead of ϕ ≡L′ ψ or
ϕ ≡LΓ ψ.
Example 8. Suppose that P = {a, b, c}, ϕ = (a∧¬b)∨ c, and ψ = (a∧¬b)∨¬c. Consider
the sublanguage L′ = L{a,b}. Then, we derive that ϕ ≡L′ ψ. However, for the sentences
ϕ = (a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c and ψ = (¬a ∧ b) ∨ ¬c, it follows that ϕ 6≡L′ ψ.
7.2 Characterization Conditions
Having introduced the necessary definitions, we formulate conditions (EP1) and (EP2),
below, which turn out to be the epistemic-entrenchment characterization of (P1) (alias,
weak (P)):15
(EP1) If ϕCK ψ and ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ, then ϕ <K ψ.
(EP2) If ϕ ∼K ψ and ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ, then ϕ 'K ψ.
14. Recall that, for a set of sentences Γ of L, LΓ denotes the minimal sublanguage of L within which all the
sentences of Γ can be expressed.
15. <K and 'K denote the strict and symmetric part of ≤K , respectively.
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To understand the intuition behind conditions (EP1) and (EP2), let us consider a con-
crete example.
Example 9. Let P = {a, b, c, d}, and K = Cn(a ↔ b, c ↔ d). The finest K-splitting is
F =
{
{a, b}, {c, d}
}
, and the unit set of K is U = {a↔ b, c↔ d}.
As for condition (EP1), let ϕ = a ∨ ¬b ∨ c ∨ d, and ψ = a ∨ ¬b ∨ c ∨ ¬d. Observe that




, and SS(ψ) =
{
{a ↔ b}, {c ↔ d}
}
. Hence, we derive that
ϕCK ψ. Moreover, ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ, consequently according to (EP1), ϕ <K ψ. However, this
is not the case for the sentences ϕ = ¬a∨ b∨ c∨ d, and ψ = a∨¬b∨ c∨¬d. Here, although




, and SS(ψ) =
{
{a ↔ b}, {c ↔ d}
}
(thus ϕCK ψ), it holds
that ϕ 6≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ. Therefore, the relative order of ϕ and ψ, with respect to ≤K , is not
constrained by (EP1), since its antecedent is not satisfied.
In a similar vein, for condition (EP2), let ϕ = a ∨ ¬b ∨ c ∨ d, and ψ = a ∨ ¬b ∨ ¬c ∨ ¬d.








. Hence, we derive
that ϕ ∼K ψ. Moreover, ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ, consequently according to (EP2), ϕ 'K ψ. However,
this is not the case for the sentences ϕ = ¬a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ d, and ψ = a ∨ ¬b ∨ ¬c ∨ ¬d. Here,








(thus ϕ ∼K ψ), it holds
that ϕ 6≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ. Therefore, the relative order of ϕ and ψ, with respect to ≤K , is not
constrained by (EP2), since its antecedent is not satisfied.
In the special case of a complete theory as an initial belief set, (EP1) is equivalent to
condition (EPC) presented below, while (EP2) reduces to a vacuous condition.
(EPC) If ϕCK ψ, then ϕ <K ψ.
Condition (EPC) appears in the work of Peppas, Foo, and Nayak (2000) as a constraint
on sentences, and has been motivated independently in Belief Revision. Essentially, it
associates the epistemic entrenchment of a sentence with the degree of support it has in
a theory; the more supported a sentence is in a theory K, the higher it appears in the
epistemic-entrenchment preorder ≤K .
Both conditions (EP1) and (EP2) are variants of (EPC). Indeed, the antecedent of (EP1)
is stronger than the one of (EPC), since it requires not only that ψ is better supported than
ϕ in K, but, moreover, that ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent modulo L⋃SS(ϕ). Condition
(EP2) is, also, in the spirit of (EPC). It deals with the case of two sentences ϕ and ψ that
are equally supported in K, and, moreover, they are logically equivalent modulo L⋃SS(ϕ)
(where, in this case, it holds that L⋃SS(ϕ) = L⋃SS(ψ)). For such sentences, (EP2) states
that they ought to be equally entrenched with respect to K.
7.3 Characterization Result
Theorem 6 shows that (EP1) and (EP2) characterize precisely the family of epistemic-
entrenchment preorders corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying condition (P1).
Theorem 6. Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗1)–(K ∗8), and let {≤K}K∈K be
a family of epistemic-entrenchment preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding
to ∗ by means of (E∗). Then, ∗ satisfies (P1) iff {≤K}K∈K satisfies (EP1)–(EP2).
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Proof. It suffices to establish a connection between conditions (Q1)–(Q2) and conditions
(EP1)–(EP2). In particular, we show that, for a faithful preorder K , associated with ∗,
and the epistemic-entrenchment preorder ≤K , corresponding to K by means of (EF), K
satisfies (Q1)–(Q2) iff ≤K satisfies (EP1)–(EP2).
( ⇒ )
Suppose that K satisfies (Q1) and (Q2).
For (EP1), assume that, for any two contingent sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L, ϕ CK ψ and
ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ. We need to show that ϕ <K ψ. Notice that from ϕ CK ψ it follows that
ψ ∈ K. Therefore, if ϕ /∈ K, (EP1) follows directly from (EE4). Assume, therefore, that
ϕ ∈ K.
Consider any world r′, such that r′ ∈ [¬ψ]. Clearly, there is a cut θ′ for ψ in K, such that
r′ |= θ′.16 Since ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ, it follows from Lemma 3 that [¬ϕ]L⋃SS(ϕ) = [¬ψ]L⋃SS(ϕ) ;
that is,
{
r ∩ L⋃SS(ϕ) : for all r ∈ [¬ϕ]} = {r′ ∩ L⋃SS(ϕ) : for all r′ ∈ [¬ψ]}. Hence, there
is a world r ∈ [¬ϕ], such that r agrees with r′ on all propositional variables in L⋃SS(ϕ),
and with a K-world on the remaining variables.17 Moreover, since ϕ CK ψ, for every cut
θ′ for ψ in K, there is a cut θ for ϕ in K, such that θ ⊂ θ′ (with L⋃SS(ϕ) ⊂ Lθ′), from
which we derive that r |= θ. Hence, it follows that Diff (K, r) ⊂ Diff (K, r′) and Diff (r, r′)
∩ Diff (K, r) = ∅, therefore from (Q1), it follows that r ≺K r′. Finally, since for some
r ∈ [¬ϕ], r ≺K r′, for every r′ ∈ [¬ψ], we derive from (EF) that ϕ <K ψ, as desired.
For (EP2), assume that, for any two contingent sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L, ϕ ∼K ψ and
ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ. We need to show that ϕ 'K ψ. If L⋃SS(ϕ) = L⋃SS(ψ) = L, then ϕ ≡ ψ, and
therefore trivially ϕ 'K ψ. Assume, therefore, that L⋃SS(ϕ) = L⋃SS(ψ) ⊂ L.
Consider any world r, such that r ∈ [¬ϕ]. Clearly, there is a cut θ for ϕ in K, such that
r |= θ (see Footnote 16). Since ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ, it follows from Lemma 3 that [¬ϕ]L⋃SS(ϕ) =
[¬ψ]L⋃SS(ϕ) ; that is,
{
r ∩ L⋃SS(ϕ) : for all r ∈ [¬ϕ]} = {r′ ∩ L⋃SS(ϕ) : for all r′ ∈ [¬ψ]}.
Hence, there is a world r′ ∈ [¬ψ], such that r′ agrees with r on all propositional variables in
L⋃SS(ϕ) = L⋃SS(ψ), and with a K-world on the remaining variables (see Footnote 17). If r
agrees with a K-world too, on all propositional variables in L−L⋃SS(ϕ), then it follows that
Diff (K, r) = Diff (K, r′) and Diff (r, r′) ∩ Diff (K, r) = ∅, therefore from (Q2), r ≈K r′.
If r disagrees with all K-worlds, on some propositional variables in L − L⋃SS(ϕ), then it
follows that Diff (K, r′) ⊂ Diff (K, r) and Diff (r′, r) ∩ Diff (K, r′) = ∅, therefore from
(Q1), r′ ≺K r. In either case, we derive from (EF) that ψ ≤K ϕ. By a totally analogous
argument, considering now any world r′ such that r′ ∈ [¬ψ], we can also prove that ϕ ≤K ψ.
Consequently, ϕ 'K ψ as desired.
16. Assume, on the contrary, that r′ |= θ′, for all cuts θ′ for ψ in K. Observe that
{





SS(ψ). Therefore r′ |=
⋃
SS(ψ), hence r′ |= ψ. Contradiction.
17. Let Si be the set of worlds in [¬ϕ], that satisfy the i-th element of R =
{




Si = [¬ϕ]. It suffices to show that there is a world, in every Si, such that it agrees with a
K-world, on all propositional variables in L−L⋃SS(ϕ). Now, assume, for contradiction, that there is no
such world in Si. Then, for every world w in Si, there is a sentence ν ∈ L − L⋃SS(ϕ), such that K |= ν




th(Si) ≡ ¬ϕ, hence, there is a sentence ξ ∈ L − L⋃SS(ϕ), such that K |= ξ and ¬ϕ |= ¬ξ
(or ξ |= ϕ), from which it follows that K |= ϕ, through a sentence in L − L⋃SS(ϕ). Contradiction.
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( ⇐ )
Suppose that ≤K satisfies (EP1) and (EP2).
For (Q1), assume that, for any two worlds r, r′ ∈ M, Diff (K, r) ⊂ Diff (K, r′) and
Diff (r, r′) ∩ Diff (K, r) = ∅. We need to show that r ≺K r′. If Diff (K, r) = ∅, then r is
consistent with K, and therefore r ∈ [K] (and of course r′ /∈ [K]). Then, the faithfulness of
K entails (Q1). Assume, therefore, that Diff (K, r) 6= ∅.
Construct the sentence ψ as follows: ψ =
∨
r′. Clearly, K |= ψ and r′ |= ¬ψ.18
Moreover, by construction, the only cut θ′ for ψ in K is the set of all units of K, that can
be expressed in LDiff (K ,r ′). Now, construct the sentence ϕ as follows: ϕ =
∨
r. Clearly,
K |= ϕ and r |= ¬ϕ. Moreover, by construction, the only cut for ϕ in K is the set of all
units of K, that can be expressed in LDiff (K ,r). Since Diff (K, r) ⊂ Diff (K, r′), it follows
that, for every cut θ′ for ψ in K, there is a cut θ for ϕ in K, such that θ ⊂ θ′. Hence, from
Lemma 1, it follows that ϕCK ψ. By the construction of ϕ and ψ, and since Diff (r, r′) ∩
Diff (K, r) = ∅, we derive that ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ. Hence, from (EP1) it follows that ϕ <K ψ.
Finally, the construction of ϕ and ψ entails, also, that [¬ϕ] = {r} and [¬ψ] = {r′}, hence
from (EF), r ≺K r′ as desired.
For (Q2), assume that, for any two worlds r, r′ ∈ M, Diff (K, r) = Diff (K, r′) and
Diff (r, r′) ∩ Diff (K, r) = ∅. We need to show that r ≈K r′. If Diff (K, r) = P, then r = r′
and, therefore, (Q2) trivially holds. Moreover, if Diff (K, r) = ∅, then r, r′ ∈ [K]. Then,
the faithfulness of K entails (Q2). Assume, therefore, that ∅ 6= Diff (K, r) ⊂ P.
Construct the sentence ψ as follows: ψ =
∨
r′. Clearly, K |= ψ and r′ |= ¬ψ. Moreover,
by construction, the only cut θ′ for ψ in K is the set of all units of K, that can be expressed
in LDiff (K ,r ′). Now, construct the sentence ϕ as follows: ϕ =
∨
r. Clearly, K |= ϕ and
r |= ¬ϕ. Moreover, by construction, the only cut for ϕ in K is the set of all units of K,
that can be expressed in LDiff (K ,r). Since Diff (K, r) = Diff (K, r′), it follows that θ = θ′
(i.e., the set of all cuts for ϕ in K is equal to the set of all cuts for ψ in K). Hence, from
Lemma 2, it follows that ϕ ∼K ψ. By the construction of ϕ and ψ, and since Diff (r, r′) ∩
Diff (K, r) = ∅, we derive that ϕ ≡⋃SS(ϕ) ψ. Hence, from (EP2) it follows that ϕ 'K ψ.
Finally, the construction of ϕ and ψ entails, also, that [¬ϕ] = {r} and [¬ψ] = {r′}, hence
from (EF), r ≈K r′ as desired. 
7.4 A Note on Safe and Kernel Contraction
Safe contraction is one of the important alternatives to partial-meet contraction (Alchourrón
& Makinson, 1985). Contrary to the latter which is based on a selection of sentences to be
retained, the former is based on a selection of sentences to be removed. In safe contraction
of a belief set K by a sentence of the language, an acyclical hierarchy (i.e., a special kind of
relation) over the sentences of K determines which sentences ought to be discarded from it.
Any safe-contraction function for a belief set K is, also, a partial-meet contraction func-
tion for K; the converse in not true. Nevertheless, it turns out that, if certain restrictions
are imposed on hierarchies, the induced subclass of safe-contraction functions coincides with
the family of transitively relational partial-meet contraction functions; i.e., functions that
18. To see that K |= ψ, observe that [¬ψ] = {r′}. However, [ψ] = M − [¬ψ], therefore, [ψ] = M − {r′}.
From ∅ 6= [K] ⊆ M and r′ /∈ [K], we derive that [K] ⊆ [ψ]. In other words, all K-worlds are ψ-worlds,
which implies that K |= ψ.
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satisfy the AGM postulates for contraction (Alchourrón & Makinson, 1986).19 Furthermore,
an hierarchy over K can be regarded as an epistemic-entrenchment preorder with respect to
K, and vice versa (Gärdenfors, 1988). Therefore, our results on the epistemic-entrenchment
characterization of Parikh’s axiom (P) can, also, be applied to identify relevance-sensitive
revision functions that correspond (via Levi identity) to safe contractions.
A natural non-relational generalization of safe contraction, as well as a generalization
of partial-meet contraction, is called kernel contraction (Hansson, 1994). Although kernel
contraction is usually associated with the contraction of belief bases, it can be applied to
belief sets as well; herein, we shall confine ourselves to kernel contraction of (consistent)
belief bases.
For presenting the process of kernel (base) contraction, let B be a belief base, and let ϕ
be a sentence of L. A ϕ-kernel of B is a minimal subset of B that implies ϕ. The set of all
ϕ-kernels of B is called kernel set of B modulo ϕ, and it is denoted by B ⊥⊥ϕ. An incision
function σ for B is a function that takes as argument a kernel set B ⊥⊥ ϕ (for all ϕ ∈ L),
and selects at least one sentence (makes an incision) of each ϕ-kernel of B to be deleted.
An incision function σ for B gives rise to a kernel-contraction function .−σ (for B), by
means of the following condition:





Clearly, the kernel contraction of B by ϕ, B .−σ ϕ, is obtained by erasing from B the
sentences selected by the incision function σ.
As earlier stated, minimal support sets and cuts are in close relation with kernels and
incision functions, respectively. Nevertheless, there are two crucial differences. Firstly,
incision functions are not necessarily minimal, while cuts always are by definition. Note
that an incision function σ for a belief base B is minimal iff no proper subset of σ(B ⊥⊥ ϕ)
defines an incision function (Falappa, Fermé, & Kern-Isberner, 2006). Secondly, and most
importantly, minimal support sets and cuts refer only to units (of a theory), while Hansson’s
concepts refer to arbitrary sentences (of a belief base). The aforementioned remarks suffice
to make kernels and incision functions non-relevance-sensitive in general, in contrast with
minimal support sets and cuts.
It has been pointed out by Falappa et al. (2006) that kernel-contraction functions (for
belief bases) induced by minimal incision functions are, essentially, maxichoice (base) con-
traction functions — a special type of contraction functions that generate “too large” belief
bases. In case the unit set of a theory K is considered to be a belief base B for K (i.e.,
K = Cn(B)), the minimal support sets and cuts of K correspond precisely to the kernels
and minimal incision functions of B, respectively. This, in turn, implies an interesting
correlation between cuts of K and maxichoice contraction functions for B.
Furthermore, given that the belief base B is the unit set of the theory K, B “splits” into
disjoint (“refined”) compartments, through the finest K-splitting. It is not hard to verify,
then, that kernel-contraction functions for B are relevance-sensitive. To see this, suppose,
without loss of generality, that B = {χ1, χ2, χ3} (where χ1, χ2 and χ3 are syntax-irrelevant
sentences), and consider any sentence ϕ of L, such that Lϕ ⊆ Lχ1 ∪ Lχ2 . Obviously, the
19. The AGM postulates for contraction are the counterpart of postulates (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8) in the realm of
contraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985).
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sentences of all ϕ-kernels of B cannot contain χ3. Since an incision function for B selects
sentences of each ϕ-kernels, the sentence χ3 will not be affected by the kernel contraction.
Undoubtedly, a thorough investigation of the way that kernel contraction, and its spe-
cialization safe contraction, relate to Parikh’s notion of relevance constitutes a compelling
avenue for future research.20
8. Epistemic-Entrenchment Characterization of (P2)
The epistemic-entrenchment characterization of condition (P2) is introduced in this section.
8.1 Initial Considerations
Definition 16 (Epistemic-Entrenchment Preorder Filtering). Let K be a theory of L. For
an epistemic-entrenchment preorder ≤K and a contingent sentence x ∈ L, the x-filtering of
≤K , denoted by ≤xK , is as follows:
ϕ ≤xK ψ iff there is a ν ∈ CnLx(x), with ν |= ψ, such that for all µ ∈ CnLx(x),
with µ |= ϕ, µ ≤K ν.
In the above definition, ϕ, ψ are any arbitrary contingent sentences of K. It is not hard
to verify that, for any contingent sentence x ∈ L, if ≤K is a total preorder, then so is ≤xK .
Furthermore, if Lx = L, then it follows from postulate (EE2) (Definition 2) that x-filtering
has no effect on ≤K ; i.e., ≤xK = ≤K . Note, lastly, that ≤xK depends entirely on Lx, as in
the case of xK (Section 6). That is to say, if x, z are two sentences such that Lx = Lz, then
≤xK = ≤zK , even if x 6≡ z.
8.2 Characterization Condition
Now we can formulate the epistemic-entrenchment characterization of condition (P2), which
is condition (EP3) below (the preorders ≤K and ≤Cn(x) are associated with K and Cn(x),
respectively):
(EP3) If K = Cn(x, y) and Lx ∩ Ly = ∅, then ≤xK = ≤xCn(x).
Condition (EP3) is, essentially, a natural constraint on the relative “retractability” of
sentences, and it is in the spirit of (Q3) making associations between epistemic-entrenchment
preorders associated with different (overlapping) theories.
8.3 Characterization Result
Theorem 7 shows that (EP3) characterizes precisely the family of epistemic-entrenchment
preorders corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying condition (P2).
Theorem 7. Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗1)–(K ∗8), and let {≤K}K∈K be
a family of epistemic-entrenchment preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding
to ∗ by means of (E∗). Then, ∗ satisfies (P2) iff {≤K}K∈K satisfies (EP3).
20. A particular type of local kernel contraction has been studied by Hansson and Wassermann (2002).
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Proof.
( ⇒ )
Assume that ∗ satisfies (P2). Let K, H be any two theories of L, such that, for some
sentences x, y ∈ L, K = Cn(x, y), H = Cn(x), and Lx ∩ Ly = ∅. First, we show that
≤xK ⊆ ≤xH .
Let ϕ, ψ be any two contingent sentences of L, such that ϕ ≤xK ψ. From the definition
of ≤xK , we derive that there is a ν ∈ CnLx(x), with ν |= ψ, such that for all µ ∈ CnLx(x),
with µ |= ϕ, µ ≤K ν. Define ω to be the sentence ω = (¬µ) ∨ (¬ν). Clearly, ω ∈ Lx. This
entails that µ /∈ K ∗ ω, and then by (P2), µ /∈ Cn(x) ∗ ω. Hence, there is a ν ∈ CnLx(x),
with ν |= ψ, such that for all µ ∈ CnLx(x), with µ |= ϕ, µ ≤Cn(x) ν. This again entails that
ϕ ≤xCn(x) ψ. Consequently, ≤
x
K ⊆ ≤xH as desired.
The proof of the converse, i.e., ≤xH ⊆ ≤xK , is totally symmetric.
( ⇐ )
Assume that (EP3) is satisfied. Let K be any theory of L, such that, for some sentences





∩ Lx ⊆ (K ∗ ω) ∩ Lx.
Consider any µ ∈ K ∩ Lx, such that µ /∈ (K ∗ ω) ∩ Lx. Hence µ ≤K ν, for some
ν ∈ K ∩ Lx.21 From the definition of ≤xK , we derive that ϕ ≤xK ψ, if ϕ is defined to be
the disjunction of all these µ, and if ψ is defined to be logically equivalent to (one of these)
ν. Then from (EP3), it follows that ϕ ≤xCn(x) ψ. Hence, from the definition of ≤
x
Cn(x),
we derive that there is a ν ′ ∈ CnLx(x), with ν ′ |= ψ, such that for all µ ∈ CnLx(x), with





∩ Lx ⊆ (K ∗ ω) ∩ Lx.




∩Lx, is totally symmetric. 
8.4 Combining the Results
Putting together the results of Theorems 6 and 7, we obtain immediately the following
theorem that provides the epistemic-entrenchment characterization of (the strong version
of) Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom.
Theorem 8. Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗1)–(K ∗8), and let {≤K}K∈K be
a family of epistemic-entrenchment preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding
to ∗ by means of (E∗). Then, ∗ satisfies strong (P) iff {≤K}K∈K satisfies (EP1)–(EP3).
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorems 6 and 7. 
8.5 A Note on Ensconcement-Based Revision
At this point, we make some observations that are crucial for a potential implementation of
an effective AGM belief-revision system for real-world applications, where a major obstacle
is the large amount of information that, in principle, the user needs to provide to the system
21. Note that if ν /∈ (K ∗ ω) ∩ Lx, then µ and ν are equally entrenched in K.
22. To see this, observe that in order to accommodate ω in Cn(x), either µ or ν has to be removed from it
(or both, in case they are equally entrenched in Cn(x)). However, taking into account that ψ ≡ ν by
definition, if we give up ν, we also have to remove ν′ from Cn(x) (for otherwise, logical closure will bring
ν′ back, since ν′ |= ψ). Hence, from µ ≤Cn(x) ν′, we have to give up µ; that is, µ /∈ Cn(x) ∗ ω.
785
Aravanis, Peppas, & Williams
(Williams & Sims, 2000).23 Recall that, in order to construct an AGM revision function
(encoding a particular revision policy), a rational agent must be equipped with a family of
(faithful or epistemic-entrenchment or selection-function) preorders; i.e., one preorder for
every theory of L. The problem is that the size of each one of these preorders is, in general,
exponential to the number of propositional variables in the language.
The epistemic-entrenchment characterization of axiom (P) — contrary to its faithful-
preorders characterization provided by Peppas et al. (2015) — is better aligned with
ensconcement-based revision (Williams, 1992, 1993, 1994), a computational approach in
the context of belief base revision schemes (Nebel, 1998).24 Briefly, an ensconcement is a
total preorder vB over the elements (sentences) of a belief base B, that can be “blown up”
to a full epistemic-entrenchment preorder ≤Cn(B), related to Cn(B). In other words, it is a
(typically) concise representation of an epistemic-entrenchment preorder, since the size of
an ensconcement is linear to the size of the knowledge base B.
An ensconcement ordering vB satisfies the following conditions:25
(v 1) For all non-tautological sentences ϕ in B,
{
ψ ∈ B : ϕ @B ψ
}
2 ϕ.
(v 2) For all ϕ ∈ B, ϕ is a tautology iff ψ vB ϕ, for all ψ ∈ B.
Furthermore, vB satisfies the following priority consistency condition, reported in
(Rott, 1991a):
(PCC) For all ϕ ∈ B, if B′ is a non-empty subset of B that entails ϕ, then there is a
ψ ∈ B′, such that ψ vB ϕ.
Condition (PCC) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the extension of any total
preorder vB to an epistemic-entrenchment preorder ≤Cn(B) on Cn(B) (Rott, 1991a). As
a consequence, ensconcement orderings are always extensible to epistemic-entrenchment
preorders.26
Having characterized axiom (P) in terms of epistemic entrenchments, in the next two
sections, we proceed to the characterization of conditions (P1) and (P2) in terms of the
partial-meet model.
9. Partial-Meet Characterization of (P1)
This section introduces the partial-meet characterization of condition (P1).
23. A recent attempt implementing the AGM belief-revision process, in the context of Answer Set Program-
ming, has been made by Aravanis and Peppas (2017).
24. Another promising approach towards the direction of making the belief-revision process tractable is
Parametrized Difference revision (Peppas & Williams, 2018; Aravanis, Peppas, & Williams, 2019).
25. @B denotes the strict part of vB .
26. Williams (1993, 1994) provided an explicit construction of such an extension. Note, moreover, that
an axiomatic characterization for ensconcement-based contraction functions was provided by Fermé,
Krevneris, and Reis (2008).
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9.1 Initial Considerations
Before formulating the partial-meet characterization of (P1), we need some important re-
marks. Let K be a theory of L, and let ϕ be a sentence, such that ¬ϕ ∈ K. Grove (1988)
pointed out that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the ¬ϕ-remainders of K and
the ϕ-worlds. That is to say, every ϕ-world r relates to a single ¬ϕ-remainder R of K, and,
conversely, every ¬ϕ-remainder R of K relates to a single ϕ-world r. From now on, we shall
denote by rR the ϕ-world that corresponds to the ¬ϕ-remainder R of K.
Definition 17 (Cell Sentence). Let K be a theory of L, and let ϕ be a sentence, such
that ¬ϕ ∈ K. Moreover, let R be a ¬ϕ-remainder of K, and let rR be the ϕ-world that
corresponds to R. We shall refer to the sentence σR =
∨
rR as the cell sentence of R.
By construction, [¬σR] = {rR} and σR ∈ K.27 The withdrawal of σR from K imposes
that, at least, one ¬σR-world must be (set-theoretically) added to [K]. However, the only
such world is rR, hence, the only σR-remainder of K is the set R; i.e., K⊥σR = {R}.
Then, for any two ¬ϕ-remainders R, R′ of K, and their corresponding cell sentences
σR, σR′ ∈ K, condition (EP) of Section 3.5 is reformulated to condition (EP)′ as follows:
(EP)′ σR′ ≤K σR iff R 5K R′.
Condition (EP)′, essentially, says that the epistemic value of a ¬ϕ-remainder of K is
inversely proportional to the epistemic value of the corresponding cell sentence of the ¬ϕ-
remainder (with respect to K).
9.2 Characterization Conditions
With the aforementioned observations, we formulate the partial-meet duplicates of (EP1)
and (EP2), which are conditions (PM1) and (PM2), respectively, presented below:28
(PM1) If σR CK σR′ and σR ≡⋃SS(σR) σR′ , then R′ lK R.
(PM2) If σR ∼K σR′ and σR ≡⋃SS(σR) σR′ , then R′ ∼=K R.
There is, obviously, a strong resemblance between conditions (PM1)–(PM2) and (EP1)–
(EP2). This is no accident; it is due to the close relation between a ¬ϕ-remainder R of K
and the cell sentence σR ∈ K, pointed out earlier.
9.3 Characterization Result
Theorem 9 shows that (PM1) and (PM2) characterize precisely the family of selection-
function preorders corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying condition (P1).
Theorem 9. Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8), and let {5K}K∈K
be a family of selection-function preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding to
∗ by means of (PM∗). Then, ∗ satisfies (P1) iff {5K}K∈K satisfies (PM1)–(PM2).
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 6 and condition (EP)′. 
27. See Footnote 18 in the proof of Theorem 6 for the justification.
28. lK and ∼=K denote the strict and symmetric part of 5K , respectively.
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10. Partial-Meet Characterization of (P2)
Lastly, we turn to the partial-meet characterization of condition (P2).
10.1 Initial Considerations
As in the case of faithful-preorders and epistemic-entrenchment characterizations of (P2),
one more definition is in order.
Definition 18 (Selection-Function Preorder Filtering). Let K be a theory of L, and let ϕ
be a sentence, such that ¬ϕ ∈ K. Moreover, let 5K be a selection-function preorder, and
let ≤K be the epistemic-entrenchment preorder that corresponds to the revision function
associated with 5K at K (via condition (EP)). Then, for a contingent sentence x ∈ L, the
x-filtering of 5K , denoted by 5xK , is as follows:
R′ 5xK R iff σR ≤xK σR′.
In the above definition, R, R′ are any arbitrary ¬ϕ-remainders of K, and σR, σR′ are
their corresponding cell sentences. It is not hard to verify that, for any contingent sentence
x ∈ L, if ≤xK is a total preorder, then so is 5xK . Moreover, if Lx = L, then condition (EP)′
implies that x-filtering has no effect on 5K ; i.e., 5xK = 5K .
10.2 Characterization Condition
It turns out that the partial-meet duplicate of (EP3) is the following condition:
(PM3) If K = Cn(x, y) and Lx ∩ Ly = ∅, then 5xK = 5xCn(x).
Again, condition (PM3) is in the spirit of (EP3) making associations between selection-
function preorders related to different (overlapping) theories as well.
10.3 Characterization Result
Theorem 10 shows that (PM3) characterizes precisely the family of selection-function pre-
orders corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying condition (P2).
Theorem 10. Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8), and let {5K}K∈K
be a family of selection-function preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding to
∗ by means of (PM∗). Then, ∗ satisfies (P2) iff {5K}K∈K satisfies (PM3).
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 7 and the definition of 5xK (Definition 18). 
10.4 Combining the Results
Putting together the results of Theorems 9 and 10, we obtain immediately the following
theorem that provides the partial-meet characterization of (the strong version of) Parikh’s
relevance-sensitive axiom.
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Theorem 11. Let ∗ be a revision function that satisfies (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8), and let {5K}K∈K
be a family of selection-function preorders (one for each theory K of L), corresponding to
∗ by means of (PM∗). Then, ∗ satisfies strong (P) iff {5K}K∈K satisfies (PM1)–(PM3).
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorems 9 and 10. 
11. Conclusion
Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom (P) constitutes an essential axiom for rational belief
change, supplementing the AGM postulates for revision. This is true, not only from a
theoretical viewpoint, but also from the perspective of a successful implementation of an
AGM belief-revision system, for real-world applications. Assuming that the revision task
grows exponentially more difficult (in the worst case) with an increase in the size of the
knowledge base, one way to attack the problem is to try to reduce the size of the set to be
revised.
In this article, we completed the constructive view of axiom (P), providing its epistemic-
entrenchment and partial-meet characterizations. In particular, we introduced conditions
(EP1)–(EP3) and (PM1)–(PM3), which are natural constraints on the relative “retractabil-
ity” of sentences and remainders, respectively. Conditions (EP1)–(EP3) and (PM1)–(PM3)
characterize precisely the class of epistemic-entrenchment and that of selection-function
preorders, respectively, corresponding to AGM revision functions satisfying (the strong ver-
sion of) axiom (P). Note that condition (EPC), which is equivalent to (EP1)–(EP2) in the
special case of complete belief sets, has been independently motivated and studied in Belief
Revision.
Future work is to be devoted to a more concrete account of relevance in Belief Revision.
Steps towards this direction have been made by Delgrande and Peppas (2018), who gener-
alized Parikh’s axiom (P), as relevance was considered to be a context-dependent property
of the agent’s underlying belief state, going beyond the structure of a belief set.
The notion of language splitting seems intrinsic to any attempt to form a theory of
anything at all. The assumption that we can ignore some aspects, while considering others,
is inherent in almost all intellectual activity. As a consequence, the results reported herein
could, also, be significant for related domains of Artificial Intelligence, where the notions
of relevance and local change play a vital role (both conceptually and computationally),
such as multi-agent systems revision, ontology update and merging, cognitive modelling,
heuristic search and optimization.
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